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Abstract
While populism challenges the pluralism and technocratic expertise on which 
public bureaucracies are based, extant scholarship has overlooked its effects 
on accountability processes. In particular, it neglects the impact of anti-elite 
rhetoric, characterized by what can be regarded as “emotionalized blame 
attribution,” on the thinking and behavior of accountability actors. Responding 
to this gap, this article examines the impact of this distinctive form of populist 
rhetoric on accountability relationships within the bureaucratic state. It identifies 
three “stages” whereby these populist pressures challenge accountability 
relationships, threaten the reputation of accountability actors, and result in 
alternative accountability practices. In doing so, the article provides a roadmap 
for assessing the impact of anti-elite rhetoric on accountability actions.
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In countries worldwide, populist leaders have launched scathing attacks the 
institutions of liberal democracy by publicly challenging the pluralism and 
technical expertise on which public agencies, central banks, and supreme 
courts are based. In the United States, President Trump frequently attacked 
experts at the Environmental Protection Agency, disbanding several of its 
independent advisory boards (Executive Order No. 13875, 2019), and during 
the COVID-19 crisis, denounced advice on social distancing offered by his 
own advisory taskforce. In Brazil too, President Bolsonaro “has coupled defi-
ant rhetoric with active sabotage of public health” (Reid, 2020) by encourag-
ing his citizens to defy lockdown measures set by the country’s health ministry, 
and implemented by state governors. Recent years have also witnessed public 
attacks by populist politicians on central banks in countries such as the United 
States and Turkey; and in the United States, President Trump mooted packing 
the Federal Reserve with “unqualified cronies” (“The Independence of Central 
Banks Is Under Threat From Politics,” 2019). Populists frame their rhetorical 
attacks as increasing the “accountability” of expert bureaucrats, who they 
often frame as a morally suspect “elite” (Mudde, 2010, p. 1175); and it is clear 
that populism challenges the expertise offered by those public institutions that 
are essential to the functioning of any liberal democracy. Yet, in contrast to the 
wealth of research that has examined the electoral success of populist parties 
(e.g., Albertazzi & Mueller, 2013; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012) and the 
impact of populism on specific policy areas (e.g., Albertazzi & McDonnell, 
2015), extant scholarship has largely overlooked the effects of populist pres-
sures on public bureaucracies, and in particular on those public servants 
whose expert authority is publicly attacked in a climate of populist hostility. 
Indeed, despite the profound implications of populist attacks on public bureau-
cracies, and the resultant challenge for established accountability relation-
ships, there has been limited cross-fertilization between research on populism 
and research on public accountability. This gap matters because the way that 
populism creates an “antagonistic relationship between the corrupt elite and 
the virtuous people” (Rooduijn, 2018, p. 363) is likely to challenge the unwrit-
ten rules and informal practices that structure crucial accountability relation-
ships between elected politicians and their bureaucratic agents in democratic 
states; and in doing so destabilize the “public service bargain” upon which 
effective public governance depends (Hood & Lodge, 2006; Perry, 1996).
In response, this article shifts the focus from what makes populism suc-
cessful to the impact of populism on public bureaucracies and the reactions 
of bureaucrats to its effects. Specifically, it examines the impact of the anti-
elite rhetoric associated with populism on the thinking and behavior of 
accountability actors. Drawing on state-of-the-art research that has demon-
strated the significance of informal or internal dimensions of “felt account-
ability” (e.g.; Hall et al., 2017; Overman et al., 2021; Romzek et al., 2012), 
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and the  importance attached to “reputation” by accountability actors (e.g., 
Busuioc & Lodge, 2016; Gilad et al., 2013; Schillemans & Busuioc, 2015), 
the article argues that anti-elite rhetorical attacks are likely to create bad faith 
in accountability processes, which manifests in how both principals and 
agents feel threatened when considering their reputation and when exercising 
their respective account-holding and account-giving roles. Flowing out of 
this, the article argues that anti-elite rhetorical attacks are likely to result in 
additional or excessive accountability demands on the part of politicians; and 
the withholding or communicating of information to alternative account-
holders, on the part of bureaucrats. To make this argument, this article delin-
eates three analytically interconnected stages at which the “public service 
bargain” and attendant accountability practices may be destabilized through 
anti-elite rhetorical attacks: a change of tone in the debate, a change of atti-
tude toward the accountability process, and a change of behavior by the 
involved actors.
By developing this overarching argument, and by directing attention to the 
three specific stages at which “bad faith” is likely to manifest, this article 
responds to calls for “fruitful cross-fertilization” between subfields to inform 
“innovative new questions and hypotheses about populism” (Rooduijn, 2018, 
p. 369; see also Borins, 2018; Stoker, 2019). To make these contributions, the 
article proceeds as follows. It commences by providing a state-of-the-art 
analysis of current research on bureaucratic accountability that has focused 
on the reputational dynamics of account-holding and account-giving, and the 
ways in which various bureaucrats experience their accountability environ-
ment. It then examines the nascent body of scholarship that has begun to 
explore the general impact of populist pressures on public bureaucracies. 
Having brought together these two separate strands of scholarship, the article 
analyzes implications of anti-elite populist attacks for established account-
ability relationships via the three stages of “tone, attitude, behavior,” delin-
eating a series of theoretically informed expectations about changes that may 
occur at each stage. The article concludes by providing a roadmap for future 
research on the impact of populism on accountability relationships to improve 
our understanding of how populism impacts democratic governance, improv-
ing the prospects for safeguarding crucial democratic norms of pluralism and 
expertise.
The Reputational Dynamics of  
Account-Holding and Account-Giving
To understand the destabilizing effects of anti-elite populist rhetoric on 
accountability relationships, it is first necessary to understand the underlying 
principles that govern the compact between elected politicians and their 
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bureaucratic officials, i.e., the “public service bargain” that has been struck. 
The concept of the “public service bargain” draws attention to the trade-offs 
made in terms of “competency,” “loyalty,” and “rewards”; and, in turn, to the 
way in which these trade-offs result in a series of expectations concerning 
functions, roles and remit (Hood & Lodge, 2006). In broad terms, the classic 
Weberian “bargain” casts bureaucrats as loyal but neutral experts, whose dis-
cretion is rewarded with career stability in terms of appointment and tenure. 
Similarly, expert agencies usually work with a trustee bargain, where the 
agency is entrusted with significant autonomy to develop and apply expertise 
according to specified remit (Triantafillou, 2015; Wood, 2019). Thus, while 
varying according to context or regime, the core of any public service bargain 
revolves around an exchange whereby politicians offer career stability and 
blame-taking, and in return civil servants pledge their loyalty and expertise.
As this suggests, accountability is central to the effective working of any 
public service bargain, enabling the reconciliation of bureaucratic autonomy 
and (the possibility of) political control (see Mulgan, 2003). At its most fun-
damental, accountability can be understood as:
a relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has an obligation 
to explain and to justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose questions and 
pass judgement, and the actor may face consequences. (Bovens, 2007, p. 450)
The public service bargain presumes a degree of discretion for the public 
servant at any level of the hierarchy; and they are asked to account for their 
behavior, and given rewards or sanctions in return (Hood & Lodge, 2006). It 
also presumes that accountability relationships are underpinned by clear and 
prospective understandings of the respective functions of account-holders 
and account-givers. In other words, accountability relationships can be seen 
as facilitating or underpinning the workings of the public service bargain. 
Indeed, public service bargains can only function if both parties comply with 
their formal rules and informal norms in a cooperative equilibrium; and these 
rules and norms are critical in providing an organizing rationale for con-
trolled bureaucratic autonomy, even when the business of practical gover-
nance is often messier. Simply put, elected political principals signal how 
they relate to their agents (the bureaucracy) by the ways in which they hold 
them accountable.
Traditionally, a large part of the literature on public accountability has 
focused on the formal rules and processes that structure accountability rela-
tionships between principals and agents, examining the formal stages in the 
“chain of accountability” that “mirrors” the chain of delegation which runs 
from voters to elected politicians and then to bureaucratic officers (Bovens, 
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2007; Przeworski et al., 1999; Strøm, 2000). Studies have tended to follow in 
Niskanen’s (1971) footsteps, and assume that “agency problems” such as 
omission (the bureaucrat fails to act in the best interests of the politician) and 
commission (the bureaucrat takes positive action that is contrary to the best 
interests of the politician) stem from a fundamental mismatch between the 
incentives and interests of principals and their agents (see Strøm, 2000). 
Flowing out of this, studies have sought to assess the conditions under which 
agency drift occurs and have examined the effectiveness of formal ex-post 
accountability mechanisms (alongside ex-ante selection mechanisms) to con-
tain these agency losses (prominent studies include Lupia & McCubbins, 
1994; McCubbins & Schwartz, 1984; Moe, 1984; for a useful overview see 
Gailmard, 2014). However, while these studies have offered useful insights 
into the way in which accountability rules and processes structure relation-
ships between principals and agents, the emphasis on the formal paints a 
partial picture. This gap has been recognized by scholars such as Posner 
(2006), who argues that “informal accountability systems” have “an impor-
tant impact in framing accountability” by “defining implicit standards for 
performance, expectations for implementation, types of information consid-
ered to be legitimate and necessary, and actions to be taken in response to 
perceived problems” (p. 80; see also Mulgan, 2003). Missing from this, how-
ever, is an understanding of how individual bureaucrats respond to such sig-
nals or manage tensions between formal accountability processes and 
informal accountability pressures. Thus, to fully understand the destabilizing 
effects of anti-elite populist rhetoric on how accountability relationships 
function, it is also necessary to examine the perceptions, experiences, deci-
sions, and behaviors of bureaucrats under the psychological pressure of 
accountability.
Recent scholarship has shown that the functioning of accountability is 
critically influenced by how account-givers and account-holders think and 
feel about their mutually constitutive relationships (Overman, 2021). Instead 
of privileging the formal rules and processes that structure accountability 
relationships, this literature directs attention to the complex entanglement of 
obligations, audiences, and concerns about legitimacy. In particular, it has 
shown that effective accountability relationships are underpinned by reputa-
tional concerns and “felt accountability” (Hall et al., 2017) on the part of 
individual agents as account-givers, and on the part of the account-holders 
(Busuioc & Lodge, 2016; Overman et al., 2021) or any other “venues of 
influence” that enact account-holding (Waterman et al., 1998)
In terms of reputational concerns, several studies have demonstrated that 
the way in which agents and account-holders perceive their reputation affects 
how they fulfill their accountability obligations (e.g., Busuioc & Lodge, 
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2016; Carpenter, 2010; Doering et al., 2021). Both principals and agents are 
concerned with their reputation: a good reputation can build bureaucratic 
authority beyond legal boundaries; whereas reputational threats risk eroding 
such authority and discretion (Carpenter, 2010). Returning to accountability 
specifically, the accountability exchanges that occur between agents and 
principals and other account-holders provide an important stage for the  public 
enactment of reputation. As Busuioc and Lodge (2016) state:
Seen from a reputational perspective, accountability is not about reducing 
“information asymmetry,” moral duties, containing agency losses, or ensuring 
that agents stay committed to the original terms of their mandate. Instead, 
accountability . . . is about advancing one’s own reputation vis-à-vis different 
audiences, for account-givers and account-holders alike. (p. 92)
Indeed, this literature anticipates that “higher reputational investment” will 
result in “more intensive account holding” to demonstrate that “accountabil-
ity is a core task for account-holders” (Busuioc & Lodge, 2016, p. 256). 
Conversely, reputational threats affect how agents provide information and 
“give account” to various account-holders, and how extensively those 
account-holders scrutinize this information. So, if accountability “greases the 
wheels” of public service bargains, then reputation “greases the wheels” of 
(formal) public accountability, with underlying reputational threats forming 
the basis of “voluntary” (Koop, 2014), “transactional” (Carpenter & Krause, 
2012), and “self-imposed” (Bovens, 2007) account-giving and the “perfor-
mance” of account-holding duties. Together, this literature draws attention to 
the way reputation is a commodity that can be won, lost, and rebuilt, in the 
“dialogue” between agents and their account-holders. As Busuioc and 
Rimkutė argue, “from a reputation basis, legitimation will come down to the 
politics of reputation: to how organisations legitimise themselves and how 
these attempts are received by relevant audiences”. In turn, this will necessi-
tate “the deployment of ambiguity, and the strategic use of communications 
to shape regulatory image and actively manage expectations” (Busuioc & 
Rimkutė, 2019, p. 8, emphasis in original).
The key assumption here is that reputational threats to public sector orga-
nizations emerge in good faith, with the behavior of bureaucrats being shaped 
by commonly-shared and commonly-understood organizational or societal 
norms (e.g., Olsen, 2013; Tetlock, 1992). Such norms include reasonable and 
fair evaluation of, and respect for, facts and logic; common standards of ethi-
cal behavior; and, analytical and legal integrity. If a bureaucratic agency 
communicates clearly how it conforms to such norms (diffuse as they are), it 
can protect its organizational “turf” against encroachment from other actors, 
Wood et al. 7
and its reputation will at least be evaluated against predictable standards 
(Carpenter & Krause, 2012; Christensen & Lodge, 2018). In turn, it is incum-
bent on relevant account-holders to treat information fairly, because those 
account-holders are themselves concerned with their reputation as responsi-
ble account-holders (Matthews, 2020). Reputational threats are hence likely 
to be clearly identifiable, with “threatening” events posed in a way agents can 
reasonably respond (Busuioc & Lodge, 2016).
The literature on reputation dovetails with a second body of work, which 
has examined the existence and impact of “felt accountability.” Simply put, 
“felt accountability” is the awareness on the part of account-givers that they 
will be held accountable, an awareness which is crucial to the functioning of 
accountability (Hall et al., 2017; Han & Perry, 2020). As Overman (2021) 
argues, “the causal link between accountability mechanisms on the one hand 
and desirable outcomes on the other is, thus, dependent on felt accountabil-
ity”; and that within this, “the individual manager’s perception of account-
ability is a crucial linking pin” (p. 4). Again, the perceptions of individual 
bureaucrats matter in terms of shaping accountability behaviors, and it is also 
important to note that those perceptions of accountability are not restricted to 
the anticipation of accountability but also encompass notions of legitimacy 
and expertise (Overman et al., 2021). Indeed, the notion of “felt accountabil-
ity” has antecedents in the work of earlier scholars who highlight the signifi-
cance of concepts such as “values” and “professionalism,” such as Day and 
Klein, who describe actions based on values as reflecting an “internalised” 
sense of accountability (Day & Klein, 1987; see also Corbett, 1996; Leat, 
1990). Individual bureaucrats are thus enmeshed in a web of accountability, 
connected to multiple account-holders or other “venues of influence” 
(Waterman et al., 1998). The accountability claims from some account-hold-
ers will be seen as legitimate while some others are felt to be illegitimate. 
Also, some of those account-holders have the required expertise to evaluate 
and judge one’s actions while others are mainly shooting arrows at a dark sea. 
Such distinctions are crucial to understand how individual bureaucrats 
respond to accountability (Aleksovska et al., 2019; Lerner & Tetlock, 1999), 
and to any threats that may destabilize existing accountability relationships.
Populist Pressures and the Challenge  
of Anti-Elite Rhetoric
Taken together, the literature above demonstrates the way in which accountabil-
ity process are rooted in emotional and affective understandings of the interin-
stitutional and interpersonal relationships that individual bureaucrats develop, 
which evolve alongside the more calculated and strategic considerations that 
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they give to their organizational reputation. In so doing, it reveals the signifi-
cance of formal accountability rules and informal accountability norms for the 
effective functioning of the public service bargain that exists between elected 
politicians and their bureaucratic officials. However, as this section makes clear, 
despite the clear threat posed by anti-elite rhetoric for the delicate equilibrium 
such bargains hold, limited attention has been given to populism’s effects on 
public bureaucracies, particularly accountability relationships.
In recent years, liberal democracies worldwide has been confronted by a 
range of populist pressures that challenge the pluralism of democratic sys-
tems, and the legitimacy and relevance of expertise in public administration 
(Borins, 2018; Canovan, 1999; Mudde, 2010). The most obvious manifesta-
tion of such pressures is the growing number of parties entering office on 
anti-establishment platforms (see Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2015; Mudde & 
Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012). In addition to these direct pressures are a range of 
spillover effects, as populist parties have challenged the established order 
even when not entering national government. Evidence suggests the indirect 
influence of populism on specific policy areas, notably immigration, integra-
tion, and national security (e.g., Mudde, 2013; Van Acker, 2020). This broader 
understanding of the range of populist pressures accords with recent studies 
that focus on the communicative, performative, or stylistic aspects of popu-
lism (e.g., Engesser et al., 2017; Jagers & Walgrave, 2007). Moffitt (2016) 
draws attention to the “discursive” or “rhetorical” styles of populism; and 
Wettstein et al. (2016) distinguish between populism “as ideology, as strategy 
or as style” and the different channels through which populist “political com-
munication” occurs. These insights are of crucial importance, sensitizing 
scholars to how populism manifests itself as a specific mode of political com-
munication or framing; and that this is not the sole preserve of ideologically 
committed populist politicians. Drawing on these insights, this article adopts 
a broader understanding of populist pressures, focusing on the impact of 
“populist communication” that is “characterized by assigning blame to elites 
in an emotionalized way” by “drawing on the emotions of anger and fear” 
(Hameleers et al., 2017, pp. 870–872).
The essence of populist communication, as Hameleers et al. (2017, p. 874) 
state, is a “frame” in which political actors including politicians, political cam-
paigners, and the media itself “blame the corrupt elites who are opposed to the 
people.” In terms of accountability specifically, it has been argued that popu-
list communication reflects a “willingness to divert political accountability,” 
as “expressed in the forms of blame-shifting and exclusivity” (Vasilopoulou 
et al., 2014, pp. 392–400). Such emotional discourse has been shown to 
increase negative attitudes toward target populations (e.g., immigrants) among 
the public, and increase their demands for accountability (Wirz, 2018), but 
also to manipulate accountability relationships within the state. In one recent 
Wood et al. 9
 example from Donald Trump’s U.S. administration, the Department of Health 
and Human Services (DHSS) produced a report highlighting shortages in per-
sonal protective equipment in U.S. hospitals. When Trump found out about 
the report, he demanded the DHHS Inspector General explain the report, via 
twitter on April 7, 2020: “Why didn’t the I.G., who spent 8 years with the 
Obama Administration . . . want to talk to the Admirals, Generals, V.P. & oth-
ers in charge, before doing her report. Another Fake Dossier!” (Ward, 2020). 
After this emotional outburst, the Inspector General was replaced, provoking 
claims from commentators Trump was pursuing a “war on accountability” 
(Ward, 2020, emphasis added). While Trump’s tweet did not override tradi-
tional accountability process, it challenged them through anger and provoked 
a response, leading to the Inspector General’s replacement.
Together, then, these studies suggest that the emotionalized blame attribu-
tion of anti-elite rhetoric risks undermining the “good faith” compact that 
underpins the public service bargain by destabilizing the established ground 
rules of accountability and informal understandings of “reputation.” Yet, as 
the introduction made clear, extant scholarship has largely overlooked the 
effects of this specific manifestation of populist pressure on public bureau-
cracies, and in particular on those public servants whose expert authority is 
challenged in a climate of populist hostility. Thus, while a Web of Science 
search conducted in June 2020 on “populism” in combination with “gover-
nance” or “bureaucracy” or “public administration” yielded 211 results, there 
were only fifteen peer-reviewed studies that specifically focused on the 
impact of populism on governance, bureaucracy or public administration 
(Andreucci, 2019; Arellano-Gault, 2020; Batory & Svensson, 2019; Borins, 
2018; Buijs et al., 2014; Cortez-Vazquez, 2020; Du Gay, 2008; Green, 2019; 
Haggerty, 2007; Knott, 2019; Meier et al., 2019; Peters & Pierre, 2019; 
Rockman, 2019; Stoker, 2019; Vogelsang-Coombs, 2007).
This small pool of studies provides useful empirical insights about the 
impact of populism on established policymaking processes and institutions. 
First, populism has been deployed by political elites as a governing strategy. 
Vogelsang-Coombs (2007), for example, shows how populist governing 
strategies have been deployed by the U.S. municipal mayors to create conflict 
with stakeholders and to bring public sector organizations into public conflict 
with political elites. Second, and relatedly, populist discourse has driven radi-
cal policy change. Buijs et al. (2014), for example, demonstrate that the 
nationalist-populist discourse perpetuated by the Dutch Party for Freedom 
(PVV) influenced a dramatic 70% cut in nature conservation budgets after 
the 2010 election, despite decades of pro-conservation consensus. Third, 
there is evidence of populist governments misappropriating the tools of par-
ticipatory governance to secure populist advantage. Batory and Svensson 
(2019), for example, reveal how Victor Orbán’s government in Hungary have 
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utilized “deeply flawed” participatory processes to secure legitimacy for 
regressive, even authoritarian, policy outputs (p. 238). More broadly, several 
of these studies have sought to develop theoretical expectations about the 
nature of what can be regarded as “populist governance.” Peters and Pierre 
(2019), for example, argue populist governance is characterized by a loss of 
expertise and enhanced politicization; reflected in practices such as increas-
ing levels of patronage and political interference in appointments, and the 
centralization and personalization of executive power (pp. 1527–1528). 
Rockman (2019) similarly suggests populist political leaders (in the United 
States in particular) aim to “unmoor government from the past and seek to 
have its future detached from expertise” (p. 1,565).
In turn, a handful of scholars have focused on the bureaucratic response 
to populist governance. Meier et al. (2019), for example, analyze the 
“bureaucratic pathologies” that can emerge as a result of “the failure of 
politics.” In particular, they draw attention to how “multiple demands from 
actors with the ability to withhold resources or to levy constraints on the 
agency” can encourage the bureaucracy to be “overly responsive.” This in 
turn risks “incoherent policies that shift with the political winds” or 
resources spread “too thinly for effective policy,” in addition to well-known 
bureau-pathologies such as “goal displacement” or “organisational cheat-
ing” (pp. 1589–1590). This formulation echoes what Koppell (2005) 
described aptly in a different context as multiple accountabilities disorder. 
Elsewhere, Du Gay (2008) considers the capacity for bureaucrats to exer-
cise their professional agency in response to the instability driven by popu-
lism. In particular, he highlights a “template. . . derived from populist 
doctrines of political right,” which “requires bureaucrats to be responsive 
to the needs of their ‘clients’.” In other words, “populist doctrines” require 
a shift away from modes of neutral, objective thinking to “re-humanize or 
re-enchant official life” (p. 340). However, the likelihood of such respon-
siveness is challenged by Stoker, who argues that “technocratic,” “civic,” 
or “democratic” responses are all “unlikely to make a difference” and “runs 
the risk of missing the thrust of the populist attack.” Instead, he argues for 
a shift away from “the argument that expresses the democratic value of 
governance as primarily based on the idea that networks are a smart way of 
governing in a complex world”; and toward a recognition that governance 
procedures can be “open to revision; backed by a recognition that they can 
develop faults.” At the same time, this “defense move” needs to be accom-
panied by an explicit “ethical and moral” rejection of populism by actors 
within governance networks, which re-asserts that “it’s not just what works 
that matters, it is also what can be justified as good, right, fair and legiti-
mate” (Stoker, 2019, pp. 14–15).
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Reenacting Accountability Under  
Populist Pressures
Taken together, this small handful of studies articulate the urgency of analyz-
ing populism’s impact on public administration and governance, as well as 
the potential strategies that bureaucrats and their organizations may deploy to 
deflect, preempt, or respond to its growing prevalence. However, while it has 
been acknowledged that long-standing pathological accountability burdens 
on bureaucrats may increase in times of political turbulence (e.g., Batory & 
Svensson, 2019; Meier et al., 2019), it is important to recognize that the 
“thrust of the populist attack” is specific and distinct (Stoker, 2019, p. 15). 
This is more serious than simply perpetuating widely recognized bureau-
cratic pathologies (e.g., the multiple accountabilities disorder identified by 
Koppell, 2005) and reflects the foundational distrust of pluralism and bureau-
cratic expertise at the heart of populism (Caramani, 2017). The challenge to 
accountability relationships posed by anti-elite rhetorical attacks therefore 
concerns the systematic erosion of the good faith assumptions that underpin 
effective accountability processes, which in turn fundamentally alters the 
way in which account-givers and account-holders understand their respective 
roles and their reputational domains.
In response, this article advocates an assessment of how individual bureau-
crats and their principals reenact their respective accountability roles under the 
weight of such attacks. To support this objective, the remainder of the article 
advances a theoretically informed research agenda to examine the way that 
such populist pressures challenge existing accountability relationships, 
threaten the reputation of accountability actors, and result in alternative 
accountability practices. Specifically, it focuses on three analytically inter-
connected stages, as detailed in Figure 1: a change of tone in the debate, a 
change of attitude toward the accountability process, and a change of  behavior 
by the involved actors. Taken together, these interconnected stages provide a 
set of theoretical expectations about how populist rhetoric may serve to desta-
bilize accountability relationships that are crucial to the effective organizing 
rationale of public bureaucracy in particular, and governance effectiveness 
more generally, and allow for pluralism and expertise in governance. This 
 section sets out these stages.
Stage 1: A Change of Tone—Emotionalized Blame  
Attribution Tightens Accountability Pressures  
(Populist Accountability Environment)
Blame attribution is important in initiating or stimulating accountability pro-
cesses. This can occur during crises or media controversies (Jacobs & 
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Schillemans, 2016), in which blame avoidance and blame attribution are key 
dynamics, or in response to already emergent accountability “episodes” 
(Hood, 2010). It can also occur during more routinized processes of “learn-
ing” where various actors feed into processes of evaluation and feedback 
(Schillemans & Smulder, 2015). In contrast, however, emotionalized blame 
attribution is a specific accountability rhetoric that emphasizes “anger and 
fear toward threatening political elites” (Hameleers et al., 2017). Anger or 
fear can be expressed, for example, in outrage at a negative policy outcome 
(“something must be done!”), or disappointment at officials’ incompetence or 
alleged corruption (“you couldn’t make it up!”). Crucial to populist rhetoric 
is that “the elite,” referring to traditional political parties or leaders and 
experts in government, are blamed for outcomes which supposedly have a 
negative impact on “the people.” Advancing such rhetoric, populist actors 
may seek to strategically escalate demands for “consequences” for political 
or policy outcomes that they perceive as evidence of immoral or corrupt pub-
lic leadership. In immigration policy for example, nationalistic populists in 
Europe and the United States attempt to “catastrophize” relatively banal sta-
tistical trends and claim evidence of elite conspiracy or cover-up. 
Commentators whip up emotive blame games about allegedly “lax” migra-
tion restrictions following the publication of new government data, to coin-
cide with scrutiny by legislative committees. While such rhetoric is not 
Figure 1. Populism’s challenges to public accountability.
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restricted to populist politicians, this policy style thrives in an age of 
 mediatization, which facilitates the rise of populism (Kriesi, 2013).
It is therefore necessary to pinpoint the existence of emotionalized blame 
attribution, both around specific “crisis” moments, but also surrounding rou-
tine accountability processes in relevant policy areas. Doing so sits well with 
the level of analysis of public accountability studies at organizational and 
individual practices and behaviors. Our approach therefore suggests public 
administration scholars first engage in interdisciplinary research, borrowing 
from communication studies, to focus on the prevalence of emotionally 
driven moralizing claims in the environment surrounding formal and infor-
mal organizational accountability processes. Whereas much extant research 
on “blame games” is focused on specific political crises and catastrophes that 
form the epicenter of blame attribution (e.g., Boin et al., 2010), the scholar-
ship detailed above shows how emotionalized blame attribution can be 
 disconnected from the “facts” of policy results on the ground—there need not 
be an objective crisis for populist emotionalized blame attribution to have 
impact. In addition, blame may be expressed in a personalized manner, 
 targeting the individual’s, rather than the organization’s, expertise.
In turn, Stage 1 also requires scholars to map the wider network of actors 
influencing public accountability processes (e.g., Carpenter & Krause, 2012; 
Stoker, 2019) or that serve different account-holders (e.g., Busuioc & Lodge, 
2016; Schillemans & Busuioc, 2015). Emotionalized blame attribution is 
likely to vary with the waxing and waning of populist parties, to either create 
pressure on accountability mechanisms or feed into standard accountability 
processes. It can also be higher for some actors than for others. As such, it is 
anticipated that when state actors exhibit such emotionalized blame attribu-
tion (populist parliamentarians and even ministers, as opposed to marginal 
populist interest groups and media outlets), the intensity of populist pressure 
on bureaucrats charged with coordinating relevant policy areas will be 
greater. This in turn may then impact how they consider their reputation, and 
how politicians perceive accountability processes, leading to Stage 2.
Stage 2: A Change of Attitude—Emotionalized  
Blame Attribution Challenges Perceptions of  
Accountability (Perceptions of Accountability)
Shared understandings of “reputation” are vital to the effective functioning of 
accountability relationships; and for bureaucrats specifically, “expertise” is a 
key reputational resource that enables bureaucrats to operate effectively at 
arms-length from their political principals. However, the way that populist 
rhetoric publicly negates the value of expertise and challenges the principles 
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of bureaucratic neutrality (e.g., Peters & Pierre, 2019; Stoker, 2019) threatens 
the reputation of account-givers. This process destabilizes established under-
standings and expectations that constitute “felt accountability” for the 
account-giver. As a result, actors in the accountability relationship may 
change their attitudes toward each other. Stage 2 therefore focuses on the 
effects of emotionalized blame attribution in terms of its threat to the expert 
reputations of account-givers and in terms of the repatriation of powers to 
account-holders. In doing so, it separates out the cognitive effects of populist 
pressures in terms of interpretations and considerations (Stage 2), from the 
responses in terms of behavior and practices (Stage 3).
Existing studies have demonstrated that reputational “threats” have sig-
nificant impacts on bureaucratic thinking and behavior (Busuioc & Lodge, 
2016; Carpenter, 2010; Maor, 2015). Studies have also shown that bureau-
crats experience competing reputational concerns (sector, agency, ministry, 
cabinet), and that the focus of reputational concerns varies according to 
seniority and task environment (Kolltveit et al., 2019). Moreover, “reputa-
tion” is not monolithic, but encompasses a range of technical, procedural, 
moral, and performative forms (Carpenter, 2010; Overman et al., 2020). 
Building on these insights, it is anticipated that under conditions of populist 
pressure, manifest through anti-elite rhetoric, bureaucrats will become highly 
concerned with their procedural or technical reputation as they seek to defend 
their legitimacy as impartial administrators and experts. Indeed, emotional-
ized blame attribution creates an atmosphere of scandal and panic, in which 
the most basic professional identities are held up to scrutiny. As such, it is 
anticipated that bureaucrats—whose raison d’etre is their neutral impartiality 
(Rothstein & Teorell, 2008)—will become highly concerned with maintain-
ing their procedural reputation; and that those whose primary role is generat-
ing evidence-based expert regulations or recommendations, will become 
highly concerned with maintaining their technical reputation. Sorting reputa-
tional from non-reputational concerns is difficult, given that shaping reputa-
tion can involve simply performing one’s job effectively (Carpenter, 2010). 
However, because reputation management is an explicitly communicative 
affair (Busuioc & Rimkutė, 2019), it requires significant resource investment 
in functions for communicating outside the organization. As such, this article 
suggests populist-driven reputational concerns will result in budgetary 
resources shifting toward public relations, stakeholder management and 
communications, and away from internally facing departments.
These reputational threats are made more acute by the centralizing and 
politicizing dynamics of populism, which are driven by feelings and emotions 
on the part of political elites. As Peters and Pierre (2019) put it, a “move to 
centralize may arise from the feeling of isolation in a ‘system’ that is hostile, 
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or because of a felt need to impose a program of change on that system” (p. 
1528 emphasis added). Account-holders influenced by populism may feel that 
the bureaucracy is “hostile” toward them, or at least feel emotionally distant 
from “elite” bureaucrats. In other words, account-holders in central govern-
ment may feel under conditions of populism, generated by populists or the 
wider media and public figures making populist claims, that account-givers 
are not being held sufficiently accountable, or not playing (or being seen to 
play) their part in the accountability process. They may therefore feel that 
stronger accountability measures are needed, in line with Peters and Pierre’s 
centralization expectation, which reflects a wider distrust of the prevailing 
political system as a whole. As this suggests, Stage 2 is also concerned with 
the feelings of account-holders about their accountability relationship with 
bureaucrats. The centralizing dynamic suggests that ministers and legislatures 
will feel the need to control and monitor their agents more aggressively, 
because of distrust in their purported professional goals. Importantly, these 
feelings are more subtle and pernicious than openly authoritarian. It would not 
be expected that ministers and parliamentarians become convinced of the need 
to strip civil servants and agency staff of their powers, but rather to feel—as a 
matter of emotion—that the accountability relationships with the bureaucracy 
have become frayed and drained of trust. In turn, it is also anticipated that this 
centralizing dynamic (and accompanying rhetoric characterized by emotional-
ized blame attribution) will further compound the feelings of reputational 
threat experienced by account-holders within the civil service and the wider 
agglomeration of agencies and satellite bodies about their neutrality and tech-
nical expertise. Locked in this seemingly vicious cycle of emotionalized 
blame attribution and deflection, it may therefore be anticipated the emergent 
changing attitudes of the actors involved toward the accountability system 
and, consequently, the emergence of an alternative set of accountability behav-
iors and processes as a response to such populist dynamics.
Stage 3: A Change of Behavior—Emotionalized Blame 
Attribution and Perceptions of Tightened Accountability Sparks 
Alternative Accountability (Accountability Practices)
Thus far, this article has set out a series of theoretically informed expecta-
tions about the anticipated cognitive effects of anti-elite rhetoric, often char-
acterized by emotionalized blame attribution, focusing on how account-holders 
and account-givers think and feel about their roles under such pressures. It 
has suggested that account-givers (the bureaucrats) will experience growing 
concern for their reputation and about the legitimacy and expertise inherent 
in accountability demands, while formal account-holders (i.e., ministers and 
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legislatures) experience declining felt accountability. In Stage 3, the focus 
therefore shifts to consider how account-holders and account-givers respond 
to populism in terms of concrete behaviors and interventions in their account-
ability relationships.
In terms of the response of account-givers, it is anticipated that the dynam-
ics of centralization and politicization will encourage increasing levels of 
patronage and political interference in bureaucratic appointments. As Peters 
and Pierre (2019) put it, “Not trusting the government establishment will lead 
populist elected officials to the use of as many loyalists as possible in the 
government,” while “working actively to move officials whom they deem 
unreliable to lower-level positions” (p. 1528). While the installation of policy 
allies to high-level positions within public agencies has become an attractive 
strategy for governments worldwide (e.g., Ennser-Jedenastik, 2016; 
Hollibaugh et al., 2014; Thatcher, 2005), it has been argued the strategic use 
of patronage appointments enables elected politicians to reconcile the “natu-
ral tension” that exists between “firm control over public policy” and “the 
need for credible commitment” (Ennser-Jedenastik, 2016, p. 823; see also 
Panizza et al., 2019). However, it is anticipated that the lack of trust toward 
neutral bureaucrats and experts implicit in emotionalized blame attribution 
will result in the appointment of political allies to senior public office, who 
either actively share or are willing to reinforce emotionalized blame attribu-
tion. In other words, under conditions of populist pressure, patronage is rede-
ployed as a tool of populist governance, as opposed to effective policy 
delivery. This has been witnessed in Hungary among others, where prevailing 
patterns of politicization (see Meyer-Sahling, 2008) have intensified under 
Orbán, with many bureaucrats being demoted or fired (Peters, 2020). 
Moreover, recognizing the critical distinction between the politicization of 
personnel decisions and the politicization of personnel processes (see 
Matthews, 2020), it is anticipated that systems of checks and balances (e.g., 
legislative committee scrutiny) may be diluted or bypassed—as has been 
argued in the case of Trump’s presidency (Johnson, 2020).
This article also anticipates that such overt acts of political interference 
will be accompanied by more subtle behaviors which are intended to under-
mine bureaucratic independence, such as reduced budgets or increasingly 
Kafkaesque accountability demands for reports, appearances in front of leg-
islative committees, and communications with ministers. This form of “gov-
ernmental” politicization should be distinguished from the “discursive” 
politicization in the public sphere (Wood & Flinders, 2014); and this article 
argues that actions such as increasing requirements for reporting imposed by 
elected representatives, coupled with contracting resources and slashed bud-
gets, amount to a politicization of accountability relationships.
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At the same time, this article is concerned with the impact of populism on 
account-givers’ actions. As detailed above, this article theorizes that bureau-
crats will become increasingly concerned with their reputation as experts when 
populist discourse becomes widespread. Such a situation presents bureaucrats 
with several options for “responding,” which divert away from communication 
with their political principals, who they view with increasing suspicion and 
trepidation. As Stoker (2019) suggests, bureaucrats may seek to re-assert their 
reputation via a defensive strategy that emphasizes their expert credentials and 
their vital role in upholding the fairness, legitimacy and transparency of the 
policy process. Bureaucrats may also seek to “give account” to a wider range 
of audiences, as alternative account-holders, to attain trust, support, and legiti-
macy (Schillemans, 2011). Nonetheless, while recognizing the imperatives to 
seek alternative account-holding processes, Stoker also questioned the capacity 
of such strategies to buffer bureaucrats from populist pressures. This paints a 
gloomy picture of the practical capacity of bureaucratic agents to protect values 
of pluralism and expertise in government. This article instead anticipates the 
installation of populist political allies (and the demotion of critics) which will 
impinge upon the behavior of individual bureaucrats, encouraging them to be 
more subservient to their superiors or less confident in voicing dissent to senior 
colleagues and ministers (see Cooper, 2018). Faced with such a challenge to 
established working practices, it is also anticipated that the installation of popu-
list political allies will—in time—encourage bureaucratic exits; as extant 
scholarship has already demonstrated the link between politicization and reten-
tion (Cooper, 2018) and the relationship between political instability and 
bureaucratic turnover (Rattus & Randma-Liiv, 2018).
Conclusion: Advancing Research  
Through Causal Identification
Populism has, over the past decade, changed accountability relationships 
between bureaucrats and political principals, a tension that goes much deeper 
than the widely researched pathologies of delegation documented in public 
administration. It raises fundamental questions about pernicious “democratic 
backsliding” where accountability relationships are subject to emotionalized 
blame attributions and disciplining, rather than nuanced and productive learn-
ing. In response, this article has argued that the impact of populist pressures on 
the thinking and behavior of political principals and their bureaucratic agents 
demands attention; and that that there is a need for the populism and public 
administration literatures to engage with each other. It has then detailed a series 
of interconnected expectations about the specific impacts of anti-elite rhetoric 
and emotionalized blame attribution on account-holding and account-giving in 
18 Administration & Society 00(0)
government. Drawing on concepts of “account-holders,” “account-givers,” 
“reputational threat,” and “felt accountability,” this framework theorizes how 
populism—as a style of political communication—may create a regime change 
in public accountability within liberal democracies, and anticipates a series of 
likely results. This is relevant, as populism challenges foundational principles 
of pluralism and expertise in democratic governance.
An important aspect of our theorizing is that it is centered at the organiza-
tional and individual levels. This accords with recent trends in public admin-
istration theory to advance productive, empirically testable propositions 
about the impact of macrolevel trends on how bureaucrats interpret their 
political environment, think about the pressures associated with their jobs, 
and subsequently behave in their roles (Jilke et al., 2019). Focusing on the 
anti-elite rhetoric of populism, this article concludes by providing a roadmap 
for future empirical research, and directs research toward a tightly controlled 
empirical analysis of relevant speeches, news reports, and similar empirical 
phenomena that are already shown to have an impact on behaviors in account-
ability relationships (e.g., Jacobs & Schillemans, 2016; Kolltveit et al., 2019). 
Future research should therefore build on this, to empirically test for the 
causal effects of anti-elite rhetoric and emotionalized blame attribution on 
bureaucratic behavior, focusing on the three interconnected stages outlined in 
this article. This forensic empirical work is crucial to go alongside the higher-
level work on populism as an ideology and as a driver of democratic back-
sliding within the broader research field. It is the hope of this article’s authors 
that scholars will take up its theoretical propositions to test the effects of 
populism, emanating from anti-elite rhetoric and emotionalized blame attri-
bution, to improve our understanding of the impacts of populism on demo-
cratic governance; and, more normatively, to defend the values of pluralism 
and expertise in advanced liberal democratic states and their bureaucracies.
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